Fatalism and Anselm’s Argument for the Possibility of the Coexistence Between Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of Choice
College
College of Arts and Sciences
Department
Philosophy & Religious Studies
Faculty Mentor
Dr. Adam Glover
Abstract
In The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice, St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109 C.E.) does not attempt to prove the existence of free will, but that it is not impossible. The debate between free will and predestination stems from the human idea of God as omnipotent and omniscient. Anselm’s argument can be simplified to three premises. First, he claims that an event that is going to happen is going to happen. Second, he asserts that before an event occurs, it is possible that it never occurs. Third, he claims that an event is going to occur (simply because it is going to occur), and it is not compelled by any preceding necessity except for the preceding necessity of free will. I argue that Anselm’s first premise is valid, but his second premise fails to support his argument, because future events only exist as potentiality until they occur in actuality; therefore, we cannot prove the existence of an event that is not going to happen. After the second premise fails, the argument cannot sustain itself. Thus, Anselm fails to prove that future events coexist until one of them comes into existence by something other than God.
Course Assignment
God and the Middle Ages, PHIL 350, Dr. Adam Glover
Start Date
22-4-2016 1:10 PM
End Date
22-4-2016 1:25 PM
Fatalism and Anselm’s Argument for the Possibility of the Coexistence Between Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of Choice
DiGiorgio Campus Center, Room 220
In The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice, St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109 C.E.) does not attempt to prove the existence of free will, but that it is not impossible. The debate between free will and predestination stems from the human idea of God as omnipotent and omniscient. Anselm’s argument can be simplified to three premises. First, he claims that an event that is going to happen is going to happen. Second, he asserts that before an event occurs, it is possible that it never occurs. Third, he claims that an event is going to occur (simply because it is going to occur), and it is not compelled by any preceding necessity except for the preceding necessity of free will. I argue that Anselm’s first premise is valid, but his second premise fails to support his argument, because future events only exist as potentiality until they occur in actuality; therefore, we cannot prove the existence of an event that is not going to happen. After the second premise fails, the argument cannot sustain itself. Thus, Anselm fails to prove that future events coexist until one of them comes into existence by something other than God.
