Title of Abstract
The Effect of Term Limits on Margin of Victory in Elections
Poster Number
083
College
College of Arts and Sciences
Department
Political Science
Faculty Mentor
Hye- Sung Kim, Ph.D
Abstract
This study examines the factors of electoral victory. In particular, it empirically tests whether having term limits on an executive’s time in office affects the margin of election victory by a candidate by using a panel data analysis on a dataset consisting of all countries for the time period between 1975 and 2015. The dependent variable measures the number of votes received in an election victory and the main independent variable measures whether or not a country has formal restraints on an executive’s term in office. This study finds that, on average, the winner of an election in a country with formal restraints on an executive’s term in office will receive 11.08 percent more votes than an election winner in a country without formal restraints on an executive’s term in office. This result was statistically significant, and appears to be robust to various specifications with a number of potential confounders. The findings of the study may imply that, in countries with term limits, elections may be much less competitive than in countries with no term limits; thus, challengers to incumbents may wish to consider this new information to reevaluate their prospective chances of victory before declaring their candidacy in elections.
Course Assignment
PLSC 350 -Kim
Previously Presented/Performed?
Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 2018
Start Date
20-4-2018 2:15 PM
End Date
20-4-2018 4:15 PM
The Effect of Term Limits on Margin of Victory in Elections
Richardson Ballroom (DIGS)
This study examines the factors of electoral victory. In particular, it empirically tests whether having term limits on an executive’s time in office affects the margin of election victory by a candidate by using a panel data analysis on a dataset consisting of all countries for the time period between 1975 and 2015. The dependent variable measures the number of votes received in an election victory and the main independent variable measures whether or not a country has formal restraints on an executive’s term in office. This study finds that, on average, the winner of an election in a country with formal restraints on an executive’s term in office will receive 11.08 percent more votes than an election winner in a country without formal restraints on an executive’s term in office. This result was statistically significant, and appears to be robust to various specifications with a number of potential confounders. The findings of the study may imply that, in countries with term limits, elections may be much less competitive than in countries with no term limits; thus, challengers to incumbents may wish to consider this new information to reevaluate their prospective chances of victory before declaring their candidacy in elections.
